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osting by EAbstract In this paper, we present a distributed and scalable evolutionary game played by auton-
omous mobile ad hoc network (MANET) nodes to place themselves uniformly over a dynamically
changing environment without a centralized controller. A node spreading evolutionary game, called
NSEG, runs at each mobile node, autonomously makes movement decisions based on localized
data while the movement probabilities of possible next locations are assigned by a forced-based
genetic algorithm (FGA). Because FGA takes only into account the current position of the neigh-
boring nodes, our NSEG, combining FGA with game theory, can ﬁnd better locations. In NSEG,
autonomous node movement decisions are based on the outcome of the locally run FGA and the
spatial game set up among it and the nodes in its neighborhood. NSEG is a good candidate for the
node spreading class of applications used in both military tasks and commercial applications. We
present a formal analysis of our NSEG to prove that an evolutionary stable state is its convergence
point. Simulation experiments demonstrate that NSEG performs well with respect to network area
coverage, uniform distribution of mobile nodes, and convergence speed.
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lsevierIntroduction
The main performance concerns of mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) are topology control, spectrum sharing and power
consumption, all of which are intensiﬁed by lack of a central-
ized authority and a dynamic topology. In addition, in MAN-
ETs where devices are moving autonomously, selﬁsh decisions
by the nodes may result in network topology changes con-
tradicting overall network goals. However, we can beneﬁt from
autonomous node mobility in unsynchronized networks by
incentivizing an individual agent behavior in order to attain
an optimal node distribution, which in turn can alleviate many
problems MANETs are facing. Achieving better spatial
254 J. Kusyk et al.placement may lead to an area coverage improvement with re-
duced sensing overshadows, limited blind spots, and a better
utilization of the network resources by creating an uniform
node distribution. Consequently, the reduction in power con-
sumption, better spectrum utilization, and the simpliﬁcation
of routing procedures can be accomplished.
The network topology is the basic infrastructure on top of
which various applications, such as routing protocols, data
collection methods, and information exchange approaches
are performed. Therefore, the topology (or physical distribu-
tion) of MANET nodes profoundly affects the entire system
performance for such applications. Achieving a better spatial
placement of nodes may provide a convenient platform for
efﬁcient utilization of the network resources and lead to a
reduction in sensing overshadows, limiting blind spots, and
increasing network reliability. Consequently, the reduction in
power consumption, the simpliﬁcation of routing procedures,
and better spectrum utilization with stable network through-
put can be easily accomplished.
Among the main objectives for achieving the optimum dis-
tribution of mobile agents over a speciﬁc region of interest, the
ﬁrst is to ensure connectivity among the mobile agents by pre-
venting the isolated node(s) in the network. Another objective
is to maximize the total area covered by all nodes while provid-
ing each mode with an optimum number of neighbors. These
objectives can be accomplished by providing a uniform distri-
bution of nodes over a two-dimensional area.
As it is impractical to sustain complete and accurate infor-
mation at each node about the locations and states of all the
agents, individual node’s decisions should be based on local
information and require minimal coordination among agents.
On the other hand, autonomous decision making process pro-
motes uncooperative and selﬁsh behavior of individual agents.
These characteristics, however, make game theory (GT) a
promising tool to model, analyze, and design many MANET
aspects.
GT is a framework for analyzing behavior of a rational
player in strategic situations where the outcome depends not
only on her but also on other players’ actions. It is a well re-
searched area of applied mathematics with a broad set of ana-
lytical tools readily applied to many areas of computer science.
When designing a MANET using game theoretical approach,
incentives and deterrents can be built into the game structure
to guarantee an optimal or near-optimal solution while elimi-
nating a need of broad coordination and without cooperation
enforcement mechanisms.
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) originated as an attempt
to understand evolutionary processes by means of traditional
GT. However, subsequent developments in EGT and broader
understanding of its analytical potential provided insights into
various non-evolutionary subjects, such as economy, sociol-
ogy, anthropology, and philosophy. Some of the EGT contri-
butions to the traditional theory of game are: (i) alleviation of
the rationality assumption, (ii) reﬁnement of traditional GT
solution concepts, (iii) and introduction of a fully dynamic
game model. Consequently, EGT evolved as a scheme to pre-
dict equilibrium solution(s) and to create more realistic models
of real-life strategic interactions among agents. Because EGT
eases many difﬁcult to justify assumptions, which are often
necessary conditions for deriving a stable solution by the tra-
ditional GT approaches, it may also become an important tool
for designing and evaluating MANETs.As in many optimization problems with a prohibitively
large domain for an exhaustive search, ﬁnding the best new
location for a node that satisﬁes certain requirements (e.g., a
uniform distribution over a geographical terrain, the best stra-
tegic location for a given set of tasks, or efﬁcient spectrum uti-
lization) is difﬁcult. Traditional search algorithms for such
problems look for a result in an entire search space by either
sampling randomly (e.g., random walk) or heuristically (e.g.,
hill climbing, gradient decent, and others). However, they
may arrive at a local maximum point or miss the group of opti-
mal solutions altogether. Genetic algorithms (GAs) are prom-
ising alternatives for problems where heuristic or random
methods cannot provide satisfactory results. GAs are evolu-
tionary algorithms working on a population of possible solu-
tions instead of a single one. As opposed to an exhaustive or
random search, GAs look for the best genes (i.e., the best solu-
tion or an optimum result) in an entire problem set using a ﬁt-
ness function to evaluate the performance of each chromosome
(i.e., a candidate solution). In our approach, a forced-based ge-
netic algorithm (FGA) is used by the nodes to select the best
location among exponentially large number of choices.
In this paper, we introduce a new approach to topology con-
trol where FGA, GT, and EGT are combined. Our NSEG is a
distributed game with each node independently computing its
next preferable location without requiring global network
information. In NSEG, a movement decision for node i is based
on the outcome of the locally run FGA and the spatial game set
up among i and the nodes in its neighborhood. Each node pur-
sues its own goal of reducing the total virtual force inﬂicted on
it by effectively positioning itself in one of the neighboring cells.
In our approach, each node runs FGA to ﬁnd the set of the best
next locations. Our FGA takes into account only the neighbor-
ing nodes’ positions to ﬁnd the next locations to move. How-
ever, NSEG, combining FGA with GT, can ﬁnd even better
locations since it uses additional information about the neigh-
bors’ payoffs. We prove that the optimal network topology is
evolutionary stable and once reached, guarantees network sta-
bility. Simulation experiments show that NSEG provides an
adequate network area coverage and convergence rate.
One can envision many military and commercial applica-
tions for our NSEG topology control approach, such as search
and rescue missions after an earthquake to locate humans
trapped in rubble, controlling unmanned vehicles and trans-
portation systems, clearing mine-ﬁelds, and spreading military
assets (e.g., robots, mini-submarines, etc.) under harsh and
bandwidth limited conditions. In these types of applications,
a large number of autonomous mobile nodes can gather infor-
mation from multiple viewpoints simultaneously, allowing
them to share information and adapt to the environment
quickly and comprehensively. A common objective among
these applications is the uniform distribution of mobile nodes
operating on geographical areas without a priori knowledge of
the geographical terrain and resources location.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
‘Related work’ provides an overview of the existing research.
Basics in GT, EGT, and GA are outlined in Section ‘Back-
ground to GT, EGT, and GA’. Our distributed node spreading
evolutionary game NSEG and its properties are presented in
Section ‘Our node spreading evolutionary game: NSEG’. Sec-
tion ‘Analysis of NSEG convergence’ analyzes the convergence
of NSEG. The simulation results are evaluated in Section
‘Experimental results’.
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The traditional GT applications in wireless networks focus on
problems of dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS), routing, and
topology control. The topology control in MANETs can be
analyzed from two different perspectives. In one approach,
the goal is to manage the conﬁguration of a communication
network by establishing links among nodes already positioned
in a terrain. In this method, connections between nodes are se-
lected either arbitrarily or by adjusting the node propagation
power to the level which satisﬁes the minimal network require-
ments. In the second approach, the relative and absolute loca-
tions of the mobile nodes deﬁne the network topology.
Topological goals in this scheme are achieved by the move-
ment of the nodes. Our approach falls into the second category
where the network desired topology is achieved by the mobile
nodes autonomously determining their own locations.
Managing the movement of nodes in network models where
each node is capable of changing its own spatial location could
be achieved by employing various methods including potential
ﬁeld [1–4], the Lloyd algorithm [5], or nearest neighbor rules
[6]. In our previous publications [7–10], we introduced a node
spreading potential game for MANET nodes to position them-
selves in an unknown geographical terrain. In this model, deci-
sions about node movements were based on localized data
while the best next location to move was selected by a GA.
This GA-based approach in our node spreading potential
game used game’s payoff function to evaluate the goodness
of possible next locations. This step signiﬁcantly reduced the
computational cost for applications using self-spreading
nodes. Furthermore, inherent properties of the class of poten-
tial games allowed us to prove network convergence. In this
paper, we introduce a new approach such that the spatial game
played between a node and its neighbors evaluates the good-
ness of the GA decision (as opposed to our older approach
which uses a game to evaluate network convergence).
Some of EGT applications to wireless networks address is-
sues of efﬁcient routing and spectrum sharing. Seredynski and
Bouvry [11] propose a game-based packet forwarding scheme.
By employing an EGT model, cooperation could be enforced
in the networks where selﬁshly motivated nodes base their
decisions on the outcomes of a repeatedly played 2-player
game. Applications of EGT to solve routing problems have
been investigated by Fischer and Vocking [12], where the tra-
ditional GT assumptions are replaced with a lightweight learn-
ing process based on players’ previous experiences. Wang et al.
[13] investigate the interaction among users in a process of
cooperative spectrum sensing as an evolutionary game. They
show that by applying the proposed distributed learning algo-
rithm, the population of secondary users converges to the sta-
ble state.
GAs have been popular in diverse distributed robotic appli-
cations and successfully applied to solve many network routing
problems [14,15]. The FGA used in this paper was introduced
by Sahin et al. [16–18] and Urrea et al. [19], where each mobile
node ﬁnds the ﬁttest next location such that the artiﬁcial forces
applied by its neighbors are minimized. It has been shown by
Sahin et al. [16] that FGA is an effective tool for a set of con-
ditions that may be present in military applications (e.g.,
avoiding arbitrarily placed obstacles over an unknown terrain,
loss of mobile nodes, and intermittent communications).Background to GT, EGT, and GA
In this section, we present fundamental GT, EGT, and GA
concepts and introduce the notation used in our publication.
An interested reader can ﬁnd extensive and rigorous analysis
of GT in the book by Fudenberg and Tirole [20] and several
GT applications to wireless networks in the work of Macken-
zie and DeSilva [21], the fundamentals of EGT can be found in
the books by Smith [22] and Weibull [23], while Holland [24]
and Mitchell [25] present in their works essentials of GA.
Game theory
A game in a normal form is deﬁned by a nonempty and ﬁnite
set I of n players, a strategy proﬁle space S, and a set U of pay-
off (utility) functions. We indicate an individual player as i 2 I
and each player i has an associated set Si of possible strategies
from which, in a pure strategy normal form game, she chooses
a single strategy si 2 Si to be realized. A game strategy proﬁle is
deﬁned as a vector s = (s1, s2, ... , sn) and a strategy proﬁle
space S is a set S = S1 · S2 ·    · Sn, hence s 2 S. If s is a
strategy proﬁle played in a game, then ui(s) denotes a payoff
function deﬁning i’s payoff as an outcome of s. It is convenient
to single out i’s strategy by referring to all other players’ strat-
egies as si.
If a player is randomizing among her pure strategies (i.e.,
she associates with her pure strategies a probability distribu-
tion and realizes one strategy at a time with the probability as-
signed to it), we say that she is playing a mixed strategy game.
Consequently, i’s mixed strategy ri is a probability distribution
over Si and ri(si) represents a probability of si being played.
The support of mixed strategy proﬁle ri is a set of pure strat-
egies for which player i assigns probability greater than 0. Sim-
ilar to a pure strategy game, we denote a mixed strategy proﬁle
as a vector r= (r1, r2, ... , rn) = (ri, ri), where in the last
case we singled out i’s mixed strategy. However, contrary to
i’s deterministic payoff function ui(s) deﬁned for pure strategy
games, the payoff function in mixed strategy game ui(r) ex-
presses an expected payoff for player i.
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a set of all players’ strategies in
which no individual player has an incentive to unilaterally
change her own strategy, assuming that all other players’ strat-
egies stay the same. More precisely, a strategy proﬁle (ri ; r

i)
is a NE if
8i2I; 8Si2Si ; uiðri ; riÞP uiðsi; riÞ ð1Þ
A NE is an important condition for any self-enforcing pro-
tocol which lets us predict outcomes in a game played by ra-
tional players. Any game where mixed strategies are allowed
has at least one NE. However, some pure strategy normal form
games may not have a NE solution at all.
Evolutionary game theory
The ﬁrst formalization of EGT could be traced back to Lewon-
tin, who, in 1961, suggested that the ﬁtness of a population
member is measured by its probability of survival [26]. Subse-
quent introduction of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) by
Smith and Price [27] and a formalization by Taylor and Jonker
[28] of the replicator dynamics (i.e., replicator dynamics is an
explicit model of the process by which the percentage of each
256 J. Kusyk et al.individual type in the population changes from generation to
generation) lead to the increased interest in this area.
In EGT, players represent a given population of organisms
and the set of strategies for each organism contains all possible
phenotypes that the player can be. However, in contrast to the
traditional GT models, each organism’s strategy is not selected
through its reasoning process but determined by its genes and,
as such, individual’s strategy is hard-wired. EGT focuses on a
distribution of strategies in the population rather than on ac-
tions of an individual rational player. In EGT, changes in a
population are understood as an evolution through time pro-
cess resulting from natural selection, crossover, mutation, or
other genetic mechanisms favoring one phenotype (strategy)
over the other(s). Individuals in EGT are not explicitly mod-
eled and the ﬁtness of an organism shows how well its type
does in a given environment.
A very large population size and repeated interactions
among randomly drawn organisms are among initial EGT
assumptions. In this framework, the probability that a player
encounters the same opponent twice is negligible and each
individual encounter can be treated independently in the game
history (i.e., each individual match can be analyzed as an inde-
pendent game). Because a population size is assumed to be
large and the agents are matched randomly, we concentrate
on an average payoff for each player, which is an expected out-
come for her when matched against a randomly selected oppo-
nent. Also, each repeated interaction between players results in
their advancing from one generation to the next, at which
point their strategy can change. This mechanism may represent
organism’s evolution from generation to generation by adopt-
ing an evermore suitable strategy at the next stage.
An ESS is a strategy that cannot be gradually invaded by
any other strategy in the population. Let uðs; s0Þ denote the
payoff for a player playing strategy s against an opponent’s
strategy s0, then s is ESS if either one of the following condi-
tions holds:
uðs; sÞ > uðs0; sÞ ð2Þ
ðuðs; sÞ ¼ uðs0; sÞÞ ^ ðuðs; s0Þ > uðs0; s0ÞÞ ð3Þ
where  represents the logical and operation. The ESS is a NE
reﬁnement which does not require an assumption of players’
rationality and perfect reasoning ability.
The game model where each player has an equal probability
of being matched against any of the remaining population
members maybe inappropriate to analyze many realistic appli-
cations. Nowak and May [29] recognized that organisms often
interact only with the population members in their proximity
and proposed a group of spatial games where members of
the population are arranged on a two dimensional lattice with
one player occupying each cell. In their model, at every stage
of the game, each individual plays a simple 2-player base game
with its closely located neighbors and sums her payoffs from
all these matches. If her result is better than any of her oppo-
nents result, she retains her strategy for the next round. How-
ever, if there is a neighbor whose ﬁtness is higher than hers, she
adopts this neighbor’s strategy for the future. Proposed by
Nowak and May games [29] offer an appealing learning pro-
cess for inheritance mechanism which is based on the imitation
of the best strategies in the given environment. Spatial games
are extensions of deterministic cellular automata where the
new cell state is determined by the outcomes of a pure strategygame played between neighbors. They can also be extended to
model a node movement in MANETs where the agents’ deci-
sions are based only on the local information and where the
goal is to model the population evolution rather than an indi-
vidual agent’s reasoning process.
Genetic algorithms
Genetic algorithms represent a class of adaptive search tech-
niques which have been intensively studied in recent years. In
the 1970s, GAs were proposed by Holland as a heuristic tool
to search large poorly-known problem spaces [30]. His idea
was inspired by biological evolution theory, where only the
individuals who are better ﬁtted to their environment are likely
to survive and generate offspring; thus, they transmit their ge-
netic information to new generations. A GA is an iterative
optimization method. It works with a number of candidate
solutions (i.e., a population), instead of working with a single
candidate solution in each iteration. A typical GA works on
a population of binary strings – each called a chromosome
and represents a candidate solution. The desired individuals
are selected by the evolution of a speciﬁed ﬁtness function
(i.e., objective function) among all candidate solutions. Candi-
date solutions with better ﬁtness values have higher probability
to be selected for the breeding process. To create a new, and
eventually better, population from an old one, GAs use biolog-
ically inspired operators, such as tournaments (ﬁtter individu-
als are selected to survive), crossovers (a new generation of
individuals are selected from tournament winners), and muta-
tions (random changes to children to provide diversity in a
population) [25,30].
GAs have been used to solve a broad variety of problems in
a diverse array of ﬁelds including automotive and aircraft de-
sign, engineering, price prediction in ﬁnancial markets, robot-
ics, protein sequence prediction, computer games, evolvable
hardware, optimized telecommunication network routing and
others. GAs are chosen to solve complex and NP-hard prob-
lems since: (i) GAs are intrinsically parallel and, hence, can
easily scan large problem spaces, (ii) GAs do not get trapped
at local optimum points, and (iii) GAs can easily handle mul-
ti-optimization problems with proper ﬁtness functions. How-
ever, the success of a GA application lies in deﬁning its
ﬁtness function and its parameters (i.e., the chromosome
structure).
In most general form of GA, a population is randomly cre-
ated with a group of individuals (possible solutions) created
randomly (Fig. 1). Commonly, the individuals are encoded into
a binary string. The individuals in the population are then
evaluated. The evaluation function is given by the user which
assigns the individuals a score based on how well they perform
at the given task. Individuals are then selected based on their
ﬁtness scores, the higher the ﬁtness then the higher the proba-
bility of being selected. These individuals then reproduce to
create one or more offspring, after which the offspring are mu-
tated randomly. A new population is generated by replacing
some of the individuals of the old population by the new ones.
With this process, the population evolves toward better regions
of the search space. This continues until a suitable solution has
been found or a certain number of generations have passed.
The terminology used in GA is analogous to the one used
by biologists. The connections are somewhat strained, but
are still useful. The individuals can be considered to be a chro-
Fig. 1 Basic form of genetic algorithm (GA).
Self-organization of nodes in mobile ad hoc networks 257mosome, and since only individuals with a single string are
considered, this chromosome is also the genotype. The organ-
ism, or phenotype, is the result produced by the expression of
the genotype within the environment. In GAs this will be a
particular set of unidentiﬁed parameters, or an individual can-
didate solution.
In our NSEG, each mobile node runs FGA introduced by
Sahin et al. [16–18] and Urrea et al. [19]. Our FGA is inspired
by the force-based distribution in physics where each molecule
attempts to remain in a balanced position and to spend min-
imum energy to protect its own position [31,32]. A virtual
force is assumed to be applied to a node by all nodes located
within its communication range. At the equilibrium, the
aggregate virtual force applied to a node by its neighbors
should sum to zero. If the virtual force is not zero, our agent
uses this non-zero virtual force value in its ﬁtness calculation
to ﬁnd its next location such that the total virtual force on the
mobile node is minimized. The value of this virtual force de-
pends on the number of neighboring nodes within its commu-
nication range and the distance among them. In FGA, a
smaller ﬁtness value indicates a better position for the corre-
sponding node.
Our node spreading evolutionary game: NSEG
In our NSEG, the goal for each node is to distribute itself over
an unknown geographical terrain in order to obtain a high
coverage of the area by the nodes and to achieve a uniform
node distribution while keeping the network connected. Ini-
tially, the nodes are placed in a small subsection of a deploy-
ment territory simulating a common entry point in the
terrain. This initial distribution represents realistic situations
(e.g., starting node deployment into an earthquake area from
a single entry point) compared to random or any other types
of initial distributions we see in the literature. In order to mod-
el our game in a discrete domain with a ﬁnite number of pos-
sible strategies, we transpose the nodes’ physical locations onto
a two-dimensional square lattice. Consequently, even thoughthe physical location of each node is distinct, each logical cell
may contain more than one node.
Because our model is partially based on a game theory, we
will refer to a node as a player or an agent, interchangeably.
Player’s strategies will refer logical cells into which she can
move, and the payoff will reﬂect the goodness of a location.
For each node, the set of neighboring cells is deﬁned with
respect to its location and its communication radius (RC)
indicating the maximum possible distance to another node to
establish a communication channel. In our model, RC also
determines the terrain covered by a node for various different
purposes such as monitoring, data collection, sensing, and oth-
ers. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we consider
a monomorphic population where all the nodes are equipotent
and able to perform versatile tasks related to network mainte-
nance and data processing. For example, RC = 1 indicates
that each node can communicate with all nodes in the same cell
as well as nodes located in its adjacent 8 cells (i.e., all the cells
within a Chebyshev distance smaller or equal to 1) resulting in
the set of 9 neighboring cells. In our NSEG, the communica-
tion radius is selected as RC = 1 for all nodes; each player is
able to move to any location within its RC.
Fig. 2 shows an area divided into 5 · 5 logical cells with 22
nodes. A node located in a cell (x, y) can communicate with the
nodes in a cell (w, z) where w = x  1, x, x + 1 and
z = y  1, y, y + 1. For example, in Fig. 2, n1 and n7 can com-
municate. On the other hand, n1 is not able to communicate
with node n9 or any other node located in cells farther than
one Chebyshev distance from cell (2, 2) (e.g., in Fig. 2, n1 can-
not communicate with n9).
In our model, each individual player asynchronously runs
NSEG to make an autonomous decision about its next loca-
tion to move. Each node is aware of its own location and
can determine the relative locations of its neighbors in RC. This
information is used to assess the goodness of its own position.
In NSEG, a set I of n players represents all active nodes in
the network. For all i 2 I, a set of strategies Si = {NW, N,
NE, W, U, E, SW, S, SE} stand for all possible next cells that
Fig. 2 An example of 5 · 5 logical lattice populated with 22 nodes (n1 and n7 can communicate, but n1 cannot communicate with n9).
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in Table 1.
For example, NW is a new location in the adjacent cell
North-West of i’s current location and U is the same un-
changed location that i inhabits now. In Fig. 2, node n1’s strat-
egy s0 corresponds to a location within cell (1, 3) and s1 points
to a location within cell (2, 3).
We deﬁne f0i;j as a virtual force inﬂicted on i by node j lo-
cated within the same cell (e.g., in Fig. 2, a force on node n1
caused by node n2). Similarly, f
1
ik is deﬁned as the virtual force
inﬂicted on i by node k located in a cell one Chebyshev dis-
tance away from it (e.g., in Fig. 2, a force inﬂicted on node
n1 by node n3). A node i is not aware of any other agents more
than RC away from it and, hence, their presence has no effect
on node i’s actions. Let us deﬁne f0i;j as follows:Table 1 Deﬁnition of strategies.
Strategy Location Movement
s0 NW North-West of the current location
s1 N North of the current location
s2 NE North-East of the current location
s3 W West of the current location
s4 U The same unchanged location
s5 E East of the current location
s6 SW South-West of the current location
s7 S South of the current location
s8 SE South-East of the current locationF0i;j ¼ F0 for 0 < di;j 6 dth ð4Þ
where dij is the Euclidean distance between ni and nj which are
in the same logical cell, dth is the dimension of the logical cell,
and F0 is a large force value between ni and nj as deﬁned below.
Now we deﬁne the total virtual force on ni exerted by the
neighboring nodes located in the same cell:
X
j2D0
i
f0i;j ¼
X
j2D0
i
F0 ð5Þ
where D0i is a set of all nodes located in the same cell.
Similarly, f1ikcan be deﬁned as:
F1i;k ¼ cðdth  dikÞ for dth < dik < Rc ð6Þ
where dik is the Euclidean distance between ni and its neighbor
nk (one Chebyshev distance away), ci is the expected node de-
gree which is a function of mean node degree, as presented in
Urrea et al. [19], and the total number of neighbors of ni to ob-
tain the highest area coverage in a given terrain.
Let us now deﬁne the total force on ni exerted by its neigh-
bors one Chebyshev distance away from it:
X
k2D1
i
f1i;k ¼
X
k2D1
i
ciðdth  dikÞ ð7Þ
where D1i is the set of nodes occupying the cells one Chebyshev
distance away from ni’s current location.
To encourage the dispersion of nodes, we assign a large va-
lue to the force from the neighbors located in D0i (i.e., F0 in Eq.
(5)) than the total force exerted by the neighbors in D1i (i.e., f
1
ik
from Eq. (6)):
Fig. 3 The probability state transition derived from a stochastic
vector ri.
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X
k2D1
i
f1i;k ð8Þ
In NSEG, player i’s payoff function ui(s) is deﬁned as the total
forces inﬂicted on ni by the nodes located in her neighborhood
as follows:
UiðSÞ ¼
P
j2D0
i
Fo þ
P
k2D1
i
f1i;k if D
0
i [D1i – ø
Fmax otherwise
8<
: ð9Þ
where Fmax represents a large penalty cost for a disconnected
node deﬁned as:
Fmax ¼ n F0 ð10Þ
where n is the total number of nodes in the systems.
The main objective for each node is to minimize the total
force inﬂicted by its neighbors, which implies minimizing the
value of the payoff function expressed in Eq. (9).
Now we can introduce our NSEG as a two-step process:
 Evaluation of player’s current location.
 Spatial game setup.
Let us study each step in detail in the following sections.
Evaluation of player’s current
After moving to a new location, ni computes ui(s) deﬁned in
Eq. (9) to quantify the goodness of its current location. Then,
it runs FGA to determine a set of possible good next locations
Li into which it can move. This is achieved by running FGA
over a continuous space in i’s proximity. Computation of Li
is based only on the local neighborhood information of ni.
Note that ni can acquire this information by various means
(e.g., the use of directional antennas and received signal
strength) without requiring any information exchange with
its neighbors.
We generate discrete locations from Li by mapping them
into a stochastic vector ri with probabilities assigned to each
cell into which player ni can move. Consequently, i’s mixed
strategy proﬁle is deﬁned as:
ri ¼ ðriðS0Þ; riðS1Þ; . . . ; riðS8ÞÞ ð11Þ
where ri(sk) represents a probability of strategy k being played.
The mixed strategy proﬁle ri reﬂects i’s preferences over its
next possible locations by assigning positive probability only
to these locations that may improve its payoff. Fig. 3 shows
the probability state transition diagram for a node in state
s4. In Fig. 3, the probability of each transition is assigned by
the FGA locally run by this node.
Player i determines if it should move to a new location by
evaluating ri(s4) as:
riðS4Þ > ð1 Þ ð12Þ
where e is a small positive number.
If Eq. (12) holds, ni stays in its current location. Otherwise,
it moves to a new location that results in an improvement of its
payoff.
In our NSEG, multiple nodes can occupy one logical cell.
All nodes located in the same logical cell will generate the same
payoff values and similar mixed strategy proﬁles resulting from
running the FGA in the same environment. Therefore, to re-duce the computational complexity, one player can represent
the behavior of all other players located in the same logical
cell. Consequently, without loss of generality, instead of refer-
ring to uj and rj for player j, we will refer to u and r for each
player located in the logical cell in which j is located. As a re-
sult, the set of each spatial game players I  I consist of up to
nine members, uj reﬂects the total forces inﬂicted on i’s neigh-
boring cell j, and rj 2 r denotes a stochastic vector with prob-
abilities assigned to each possible location that player(s)
occupying cell j may move to at the next step.
Spatial game setup
If player i decides to move to a new location using Eq. (12), she
gathers uj and rj for all j 2 I. Node i constructs its payoff ma-
trix Mi with an entry for each possible strategy proﬁle s that
can arise among members I. Each element of Mi reﬂects the
goodness of i’s next location over possible combinations of
all other players’ strategies. After that, i computes its expected
payoff for this game as:
UiðrÞ ¼
X
s2S
ðPj2IrjðsjÞÞuiðsÞ ð13Þ
Expected payoff uiðrÞ is an estimation of what the total
forces inﬂicted on player i will be if she plays her mixed strat-
egy proﬁle rj against her opponents’ strategy proﬁles ri1. As
such, uiðrÞ is an indication of i’s possible improvement result-
ing from the mixed strategy proﬁle obtained by FGA.
Our FGA only takes into account the current positions of
the neighboring nodes to ﬁnd the next locations to move.
However, our NSEG, combining FGA with game theory,
can ﬁnd even better locations since it uses additional informa-
tion regarding the payoffs of the neighbors as deﬁned in Eq.
(9). We formalize this notion in the lemma below.
Lemma 1. Player i’s mixed strategy proﬁle ri obtained from
FGA may not reﬂect the best new location(s) for player i.
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equally distanced neighbors from i. Suppose also that there is a
node m in the same cell as i. Consequently, our FGA will
decide that i should move into one of its neighboring cells
because of m. In this setting, FGA will result in ri(s4) = 0
(i.e., the probability of staying in the same location is 0). This
decision is based on the fact that FGA only takes into account
the forces inﬂicted on a player by its neighbors (Eqs. (7) and
(5)).
It is clear that FGA cannot distinguish the optimal choice
among the possible positions to move within its neighboring
cells since the forces applied from each direction are equal by
the above assumption. Hence, it is possible that our FGA
assigns a probability of 1 to a strategy k (i.e., ri(sk) = 1) while
a better strategy j exists (requiring to move to cell j) with
uj(s)< uk(s) (Eq. (9)). h
Lemma 1 shows that player i’s mixed strategy proﬁle may
not be the most proﬁtable strategy in her proximity. Therefore,
player i should utilize additional information about its neigh-
bors’ payoffs and mixed strategy proﬁles (Eqs. (9) and (11))
to determine if locations obtained from FGA are indeed the
best and what her next location should be. Hence, player i sets
up a spatial game among her and all other members of I to
compute her expected payoff from this interaction (Eq. (13)).
Let us consider the neighboring cells for player i. Recall
that each neighboring cell j 2 I will have forces, called uj, ap-
plied on it by its local neighbors. Let Cmin ¼ minfu0; u1; . . . ;
u8g denote player i’s neighboring cell such that the forces in-
ﬂicted on it is the minimum.
To make its movement decision, player i evaluates its pos-
sible improvement reﬂected in uiðrÞ against Cmin using the fol-
lowing equation:
Cmin þ a < uiðrÞ ð14Þ
where a represents the value by which the total force on the
logical cell Cmin would have changed if player i moved there.
In this case, if there exists a logical cell Cmin in player i’s neigh-
borhood that guarantees her better improvement than loca-
tion(s) returned by FGA, she should move into Cmin.
Therefore, as a direct result of Lemma 1 and Eq. (14), we
can state the following corollaries which govern decisions of
our NSEG.
Corollary 1. If the expected improvement for player i resulting
from moving into a location obtained by FGA is worse than
moving into Cmin (Eq. (14)), player i’s next position should be
Cmin.
Corollary 2. If the expected improvement for player i obtained
from FGA is better than (or the same as) moving into Cmin
(Eq. (14)), player i selects her next location according to her
mixed strategy proﬁle ri.Analysis of NSEG convergence
In NSEG, a movement decision for node i is based on the out-
come of the locally run FGA and the spatial game set up
among i and the nodes in its neighborhood. Each node pursues
its own goal of reducing the total force inﬂicted on it by effec-tively positioning itself in one of the neighboring cells. How-
ever, our ultimate goal is to evolve the entire system toward
a uniform node distribution as a result of each individual
node’s selﬁsh actions. In order to analyze the performance of
a system, we deﬁne the optimal solution for each node and
its effect on the entire node population.
The worst possible state for player i is to become isolated
from the other nodes, in which case ui ¼Fmax and player i can-
not interact with any other nodes to improve its payoff. From
the entire network perspective, the disconnected node adds lit-
tle to the network performance and can be considered a lost re-
source. Eq. (9) guarantees that no individual node chooses a
new location which will result in becoming disconnected.
Since an additional node located in the same cell as player i
(i.e., D1i ¼ 1) affects i’s payoff adversely to the greater degree
than the distant located neighbors (i.e., members of D1i ), player
i prefers to be the only occupant of its current logical cell. Mul-
tiple nodes in a single cell are also undesirable from the net-
work perspective, as the area coverage could be improved by
transferring the additional node into a new empty cell where
possible. Therefore, given a large enough terrain, a preferred
network topology would have each cell occupied by at most
one node without any disconnected nodes, which is precisely
the goal of each player in our NSEG.
Let s* be a strategy for a non-isolated player i who is the
sole occupant of her cell. Let sopt, be an optimal strategy, rep-
resenting a permutation of neighbor locations and mixed strat-
egy proﬁles si . Suppose, at some point in time, all nodes evolve
their positions such that each node plays its own optimal strat-
egy of sopt. Then a strategy proﬁle S
 ¼ ðS1;S2; . . . ; snÞ repre-
sents a network topology in which each node is a single
occupant in its cell and there are no disconnected nodes. In
our NSEG, the main objective for each node is to minimize
the total force inﬂicted on it, which translates into the goal
of minimizing the value of the payoff functions deﬁned in
Eqs. (9) and (13). Let an invading sub-optimal strategy
S0j – s

opt be played by player j. Then s

opt is ESS if the following
condition holds:
Uðsopt; soptÞ < uðs0j; soptÞ ð15Þ
where an optimal strategy sopt can be played by any i 2 I n j.
The following
lemma shows that a strategy sopt is evolutionary stable and,
hence, no strategy can invade a population playing s.
Lemma 2. A strategy sopt is evolutionary stable.
Proof. There are two cases in which player j’s strategy S0j may
differ from sopt. In one of them, strategy S
0
j represents a case
where player j is disconnected and, as stated in Eq. (9), receives
payoff Fmax, which is strictly greater than any possible
uðsopt; soptÞ. If, on the other hand, strategy S0j stands for player
j’s location in the cell already occupied by some other node,
then, according to Eq. (8), uðsopt; soptÞ < uðs0j; soptÞ. Conse-
quently, in both cases in which s0j – s

opt invades a population
playing strategy sopt (i.e., a population playing a strategy pro-
ﬁle s), ﬁrst condition of ESS (Eq. (15)) holds, establishing that
sopt is an ESS. h
Lemma 2 shows that when entire population plays the strat-
egy in which each individual node is a single occupant of its
cell and is connected to at least one other node, no other strat-
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can generalize the results of Lemma 2 in the following
corollary.
Corollary 3. A strategy s\ represents a stable network topology
that will maintain its stability since no node has any incentive to
change its current position.Experimental results
We implemented NSEG using Java programming language.
Our software implementation consists of more than 3,000 lines
of algorithmic Java code. For each simulation experiment, the
area of deployment was set to 100 · 100 unit squares. Initially,
the nodes were placed in the lower-left corner of the deploy-
ment area, and have no knowledge of the underlining terrain
and neighbors’ locations. This initial distribution represents
realistic situations where nodes enter the terrain from a com-
mon entry point (e.g., starting node deployment into an earth-
quake area from a single location) compared to random or any
other types of initial distributions we see in the literature. Each
simulation experiment was repeated 10–15 times and the re-
sults were averaged to reduce the noise in the observations.
The snapshot in Fig. 4 shows a typical initial node distribu-
tion before NSEG is run autonomously by each node. The to-
tal deployment area is divided into 10 · 10 logical cells (each
10 · 10 unit squares). The four cells located in the lower-left
corner are occupied by a population of 80 nodes (i.e.,
n= 80). The shaded area around the nodes indicates the por-
tion of the terrain cumulatively covered by the communication
ranges of the nodes.Fig. 4 The probability state transitionThe snapshot of the node positions after running NSEG
10 steps is shown in Fig. 5. We can observe that even in
the early stages of the experiment, the nodes are able to dis-
perse far from their original locations and provide signiﬁcant
improvement of the area coverage while keeping network
connected. However, since it is very early in the experiment,
there is still a notable node concentration in the area of initial
deployment.
A stable node distribution after running NSEG for 60 time
units is shown in Fig. 6. At this time no cell is occupied by
more than one node and the entire terrain is covered by the
nodes’ communication ranges. The snapshot in Fig. 6 repre-
sents the stable state for this population. As presented in Lem-
ma 2 and Corollary 3, after this stable topology is reached, no
node has an incentive to change its location in the future. After
step 60, this stable network topology for this example remains
unchanged in all consecutive iterations of our NSEG, which
veriﬁes the conclusions of Lemma 2 and Corollary 3.
Network area coverage (NAC) is an important metric of
our NSEG effectiveness. NAC is deﬁned as the ratio of the
area covered by the communication ranges of all nodes and
the total geographical area. NAC value of 1 implies that the
entire area is covered. Fig. 7 shows the improvement of
NAC and the total number of cells that are occupied at each
step of the simulation as NSEG progresses. We can observe
that the entire area becomes covered by mobile nodes’ commu-
nication areas (i.e., NAC= 1) after approximately 40 itera-
tions of NSEG. However, the number of occupied cells
keeps increasing for another 20 steps up to a point where each
cell becomes occupied by at most one node. We can derive two
conclusions from this observation: (i) for the deployment of
100 · 100 unit square area divided into 10 · 10 logical cells,derived from a stochastic vector ri.
Fig. 5 Node distribution obtained by 80 autonomous nodes running NSEG for 10 steps.
Fig. 6 Stable node distribution obtained by 80 autonomous nodes after running NSEG for 60 steps.
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the goal of the total area coverage is achieved, the network
topology do not stabilize until the optimal strategy proﬁle s\
is realized by the entire network.Fig. 8 shows the improvement in NAC for networks with
different number of mobile nodes. We can see in this ﬁgure
that for larger values of n, the network requires more time to
achieve its maximal terrain coverage since there are more
Fig. 7 NAC and the number of occupied logical cells obtained by 80 autonomous nodes running NSEG.
Fig. 8 Improvement of NAC by NSEG in different network sizes (n= 20 to 100).
Self-organization of nodes in mobile ad hoc networks 263nodes to disperse from the same small initial deployment area.
However, maximal NAC achieved by NSEG increases notably
as the number of nodes deployed in the same geographical area
increases. It can also be seen in Fig. 8 that the rate at which
networks increase their NACs is independent of the number
of nodes (up to the point where the maximum coverage areas
of relative populations are reached). This observation allows
us to project the performance of NSEG in a larger area than
100 · 100 unit squares or in the situations where the logical
cells are smaller than selected for our experiments. In Fig. 8,
it is clear that a network with 60 nodes is not sufﬁcient to cover
the entire area, whereas a 100-node network does not further
improve NAC compared to an 80-node network. This observa-
tion justiﬁes our network size selection for the experiment
shown in Figs. 4–7.
Our simulation results show that NSEG can be effective in
providing a satisfactory level of area coverage with near uni-form node distribution while utilizing only the local informa-
tion by each autonomous agent. Since our model does not
require a global coordination, a priori knowledge of a deploy-
ment environment, or a strict synchronization among the
nodes, it presents an easily scalable solution for networks com-
posed of self-positioning autonomous nodes.
Concluding remarks
We introduce a new approach for self-spreading autonomous
nodes over an unknown geographical territory by combining
a force-based genetic algorithm (FGA), traditional game the-
ory and evolutionary game theory. Our node spreading evolu-
tionary game (NSEG) runs at each mobile node making
independent movement decisions based on the outcome of a
locally run FGA and the spatial game set up among itself
and its neighbors. In NSEG, each node pursues its own selﬁsh
264 J. Kusyk et al.goal of reducing the total virtual force inﬂicted on it by effec-
tively positioning itself in one of the neighboring cells. Never-
theless, each node’s selﬁsh actions lead the entire system
toward a uniform and stable node distribution.
Our FGA only takes into account the current positions of
the neighboring nodes to ﬁnd the next locations to move.
However, NSEG, combining FGA with game theory, can ﬁnd
even better locations since it uses additional information
regarding the payoffs of the neighbors. We present a formal
analysis of our NSEG and prove that the evolutionary stable
state ESS is its convergence point.
Our simulation results demonstrate that NSEG performs
well with respect to network area coverage, uniform distribu-
tion of mobile nodes, and convergence speed.
Since NSEG does not require global network information
nor strict synchronization among the nodes, future extension
of this research will focus on real-life applications of NSEG
to the node spreading class of problems in both military and
commercial tasks.
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